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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE
INVESTMENT: A SPATIAL APPROACH
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Abstract. The importance of infrastructure for growth is well
established in the macroeconomic literature. Previous research
has treated public investment in infrastructure as exogenous. We
remedy this shortcoming by providing a political economy analysis
of infrastructure choice based upon consumer preferences derived
from spatial competition models. The transport cost parameter
provides a natural index of infrastructure in these models. In this
setting, infrastructure investment has two possible eﬀects: to di-
rectly lower transaction costs and indirectly to aﬀect market power.
We begin with a single marketplace model in which only the direct
eﬀect is present and then bring in the indirect eﬀect by extending
the analysis to competition on the circle. Analysis of market struc-
ture, consumer participation, entry and transport cost curvature
give a rich variety of results. Socially optimal outcomes occur in
some cases but infrastructure traps are common. Our results sug-
gest that in less developed countries competition enhancing policies
are a key prerequisite for public support of infrastructure invest-
ment.
1. Introduction
Whether it is the Internet or freeways, infrastructure improves the
functioning of an economy. Road building and the improvements in
telecommunications infrastructure have both been found to have a
signiﬁcant impact on productivity and growth for a wide selection
of OECD countries. At the same time, in both policy quarters and
academic circles, lack of proper infrastructure is often blamed for the
poor performance of the less developed countries. This traditional wis-
dom – of a positive relationship between infrastructure and produc-
tivity/growth – has recently found support in the empirical macroe-
conomic literature (see for example Aschauer (1989), Fernald (1999),
Roller and Waverman (2001)). These empirical models, though sophis-
ticated in their treatment, are too macroscopic to show who beneﬁts
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from infrastructure and how these individual beneﬁts result in govern-
ment investment decisions. Thus the macroeconomic literature leaves
us with a clear indication of the importance of infrastructure, but no
deep understanding of the economic role of infrastructure and the pro-
cesses determining the level of infrastructure. The endogenous growth
models are not satisfactory either, since in those models infrastructure
cannot be distinguished from other forms of capital.
Interpreting infrastructure more broadly - so as to include physical
as well as institutional infrastructure (e.g. trade liberalization, bank-
ing sector reforms) - Aghion and Schankerman (2001) shows how an
improvement in infrastructure aﬀects the competitive process. Despite
a more micro-oriented approach, their work (like the other works men-
tioned above) treats infrastructure investment as exogenous. This is
unsatisfactory because a full economic investigation of infrastructure
should identify its determinants as well as its eﬀects.
The standard theoretical response - infrastructure investment is cho-
sen by a social planner - is too unrealistic to be useful for prediction,
except maybe in a handful of dictatorial regimes. Though the social op-
timum is an important benchmark, choice of infrastructure investment,
in any democracy, is a political process. As Bud Shuster, Chair of the
US House Transportation Committee puts it - ” Angels in heaven do
not decide where the highways will be built. This is a political process.”
And so is every other signiﬁcant infrastructure decision.
A key feature of infrastructure investment is that the gains/losses
are not distributed equally across diﬀerent agents within a country. To
capture this we need to incorporate consumer heterogeneity, which we
do with a variety of spatial competition models. The transport cost
parameter in a spatial competition model has a natural interpretation
as an index of infrastructure. Since consumers have diﬀerent locations
they utilize infrastructure diﬀerently. This in turn gives rise to prefer-
ences for the level of infrastructure that vary with location which feed
into the political process.
We assume infrastructure is provided by the government “at cost”
at a level determined by the existing political process. Two related
political paradigms are analyzed: referenda and electoral competition.
Regional authorities, states and even small countries such as Switzer-
land frequently use referenda to approve public infrastructure invest-
ments and the associated tax levy. Large states and countries more
typically employ representative democracy and electoral competition
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Infrastructure, such as roads, telephones and antitrust regulation, is
important because it directly determines the net utility a consumer re-
ceives from a purchase. A second, indirect, eﬀect of infrastructure is its
inﬂuence on the competitive environment. Low levels of infrastructure
give diﬀerentiated ﬁrms strong local monopoly power. Alternatively
high level of infrastructure make swapping between diﬀerentiated ﬁrms
a low-cost activity for consumers leading to ﬁerce local competition
between ﬁrms.
Our approach is diﬀerent from the standard public goods analysis
because voters derive no direct utility from infrastructure. We derived
endogenously voter preferences over infrastructure from the dual role
of voters as consumers in a spatial market. At an abstract level voter
choices over infrastructure aﬀect the “ rules of the game” when they
make their purchasing decisions. However the ﬁnal impact of a change
in infrastructure on voter/consumers utility depends in a subtle and
rich way on the details of the spatial market. Rather than provide a
taxonomy of every spatial model we instead focus on cases of practical
and theoretical signiﬁcance to illustrate the rich variety of outcomes
possible under our approach.
In a small or underdeveloped region or country agglomeration forces
may have produced only a single commercial centre. We refer to this
situation as a single marketplace
1.
The single marketplace eliminates spatial competition making all
ﬁrms homogeneous and thus allowing us to focus on the direct eﬀect
of infrastructure in facilitating trade. Market structure is important
in this situation because under competition the political outcome can
be close to, or at, the socially optimal level of infrastructure while
under monopoly an infrastructure trap will occur with no investment
in welfare in enhancing infrastructure.
In an even less developed country, with lower levels of infrastructure,
transport costs may prevent some consumers from accessing the single
marketplace at all. In this incomplete market coverage case the political
analysis is complicated by the emergence of a group of voters who only
pay tax and do not consume the good. Median voter theorems fail in
this situation however we show that even competition fails to avoid an
infrastructure trap in this case
Large economies are characterised by greater ﬁrm diﬀerentiation
which we analyze by extending our approach to a Salop circle model.
1Our single marketplace is related to the single place or monocentric city of
regional science/urban economics. Unlike regional science we do not focus on land
rents but instead take an industrial organisation approach focusing on the details
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This extension introduces a second eﬀect for infrastructure investment,
namely to increase spatial competition by lowering transport costs be-
tween ﬁrm locations. In the short run collusion or multiproduct monop-
oly still leads to an infrastructure trap. However short run competition
on the circle leads to overprovision of infrastructure as opposed to the
under provision in the single marketplace model. This overprovision
occurs as consumers reap the indirect beneﬁt of increased competition
which was not present in the single marketplace.
Free entry in the long run completely transforms our conclusions
about the role of competition on the circle. Entry/exit means that an
improvement in infrastructure causes not just a drop in per unit trans-
port costs but also a diﬀerent conﬁguration of ﬁrm locations. Form-
ing expectations over possible ﬁrm locations causes consumers endoge-
nously to exhibit a status quo bias. The status quo bias manifests itself
as a reduced preference for investment leading to either the socially op-
timal outcome or an infrastructure trap.
2. A Model of Infrastructure Investment
Assume that a unit mass of consumers are uniformly distributed
in a region, represented as a closed interval [−1
2, 1
2] and n(≥ 1) ﬁrms
producing a product with marginal cost c ≥ 0 are located at the center.
There are no ﬁxed costs.2 Each consumer buys either zero or one unit
of the product which yields gross utility of A per unit of consumption.
In addition to paying p = min{p1,p2,...,pn}, a consumer living at an
address y, y ∈ [−1
2, 1
2], bears transport cost t|y|β (β ≥ 1) to purchase
the product. Consumer y’s net utility from consumption, denoted by
V (y) is given by
(2.1) V (y) = A − p − t|y|
β.
The consumers have a generic outside option which yields zero utility.
This implies that consumer y purchases the product as long as V (y) ≥
0.
We interpret the transport cost parameter t as an index of infras-
tructure. More speciﬁcally we consider a reduction in t as resulting
from an investment in infrastructure. The interpretation is quite nat-
ural in the geographical context where improvements in roads or rail
connections, or the construction of a free way system naturally lead
to lower physical transportation costs. More generally we might think
of the consumers being located in a characteristic space. Aghion and
Schankerman (2001) suggest that the transportation cost parameter in
2We relax this in the spatial competition model with free entry.POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT: A SPATIAL APPROACH 5
a characteristic space measures the level of competition between ﬁrms.
As a result they claim t would be reduced by infrastructure investments
which increase competition, for example law and order, or anti-trust
regulation and enforcement.
We assume t is determined by consumers/voters through a politi-
cal process.3. Starting from an initial t0, an investment of I reduces
transport cost to t0 − I. An investment of amount I costs
γI2
2 and is
ﬁnanced by lumpsum tax of g per consumer. Since there is unit mass
of consumers the total tax revenue is g.1 = g as well. This implies
that in equilibrium g =
γI2
2 .4 The tax g or equivalently the level of
investment I is determined by political process.
The sequence of events is as follows. Initially the political process
determines the level of infrastructure investment I which determines
transport cost t = t0 − I. Subsequently, ﬁrms set prices, then a con-
sumer decides whether to purchase or not.
Market Coverage: Since the consumers are symmetrically distributed
in [−1
2, 1
2] around the center, hereafter we focus our analysis on the
closed interval [0, 1
2]. Given an investment level I determined by the
political process (which implies t = t0 − I) and equilibrium price p∗,
we rewrite the indirect utility given in (2.1) as follows:
(2.2) V (y,I) = A − p
∗ − (t0 − I)y
β
where y ∈ [0, 1
2]. Denote ˆ y(I) as the address of the farthest consumer
who buys the the product. If V (1
2,I) ≥ 0, ˆ y(I) = 1
2, else ˆ y(I) satisﬁes















For a given investment level I, market coverage is complete if ˆ y(I) = 1
2
and incomplete if ˆ y(I) < 1
2.
Price equilibria: In presence of n ≥ 2 ﬁrms, Bertrand competition
yields p∗
i = c for all i and accordingly p∗ = min{p∗
1,p∗
2,...,p∗
n} = c. For
the monopoly case, n = 1, there are two possible scenario. First, for
I < t0 − 2β(A−c
1+β), market is not fully covered and p∗ = argmaxp(p −






1+β . For I ≥ t0 − 2β(A−c
1+β), the
monopolist ﬁnds it optimal to serve the entire market and p∗ is such
3There are a handful of papers which treats t as endogenous .....
4We implicitly assume that the proceeds from lumpsum tax cannot be used for
redistributive purposes.6 ARGHYA GHOSH AND KIERON MEAGHER
V (1
2,I) = 0 implying p∗ = A −
t0−I
2β . Observe that, except for the
complete coverage under monopoly, prices are independent of the level
of infrastructure provision.5 With monopoly and complete coverage,
lower t allows the monopoly to extract more rent from the farthest as
well as other consumers and hence p∗ is increasing in I.
In order to focus on voting behavior of consumers, we assume that
proﬁts, if any, accrue to a measure zero of elite. This accords well
with ﬁndings in developing countries where shareholding is extremely
skewed. For n ≥ 2 ﬁrms in this section, and free entry in spatial
competition model discussed in section 4, the proﬁts are zero and hence
it does not aﬀect the voting behaviour or the surplus measures (deﬁned
below). For other cases — e.g n = 1 and ﬁxed number of ﬁrms case
in spatial competition setup — the assumption has some bite. We
discuss the eﬀect of positive shareholding in section 5. In absence
of shareholding by consumers, surplus of a consumer y, denoted by
S(y,I), is the indirect utiility from consumption less tax, i.e.




Aggregate Surplus Measures: Though individual surplus measure
is useful in determining the voting behavior of an individual the cost-
beneﬁt comparison requires aggregate measures. Two aggregate sur-
plus measures are introduced below. The measures are deﬁned gener-
ally so that they can be used for comparison in the later sections. The
ﬁrst measure, denoted by B(I) is simply the sum of consumer surplus
for all y —











The second measure, aggregate social surplus, denoted by W(I), is the




i − c) − K], where K denotes ﬁxed costs.6 Using
(2.5), W(I) can be expressed as follows:
(2.6) W(I) = 2
Z ˆ y(I)
0




5The intermediate values p ∈ [c,
βA+c
1+β ] are possible as well — e.g.(i) a price
ceiling with n = 1 and (ii) a price ﬂoor with n ≥ 2.
6K is assumed to be zero in this section.POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT: A SPATIAL APPROACH 7
3. Political Economy
At regional or local levels or even at a country level (especially if the
country is small), proposals for change from existing state — status quo
— are often put forward in a referendum. In current context it works as
follows. A positive level of income tax g =
γI2
2 is proposed to ﬁnance a
infrastructure investment of amount I which lowers the transport cost
from t0 to t0 − I. The proposal is passed in the referendum if at least
50% of the consumers/voters vote in favor of the proposal against the
status quo I = 0.
A consumer y votes in favour of the proposed investment level I if and
only if S(y,I)−S(y,0) ≥ 0. Let µ(I) denote the measure of consumers
who vote in favour of the proposed positive level of investment I. We
deﬁne R0 as the set of investment levels which a majority of voters
favour over status quo I = 0, i.e.
(3.1) R




To facilitate comparison with other benchmarks deﬁned below, we
adopt the convention that 0 ∈ R0. In order to understand the extent
of distortion in the political outcomes, we consider two benchmarks
based on the surplus measures B(I) and W(I) introduced in previous
subsection.
(3.2) B
0 := {I : I ≥ 0,B(I) − B(0) ≥ 0}
(3.3) W
0 := {I : I ≥ 0,W(I) − W(0) ≥ 0}
The set B0 (W 0) consists of investment levels for which the aggregate
consumer surplus (social surplus) is higher compared to the status quo.
Following the standard practice in the voting literature, in the pair-
wise voting scenario, we use the concept of Condorcet winner. For any
two investment levels I1 and I2, let m1(I1,I2) denote the measure of
consumers that prefers I1 to I2 and similarly let m2(I1,I2) denote the
measure of consumers that prefers I2 to I1. An investment level I∗ is
a Condorcet winner if for all I 6= I∗,m1(I∗,I) ≥ m2(I∗,I). In absence
of possibility of abstention this implies I∗ is a Condorcet winner if
m1(I∗,I) ≥ 1
2 for all I 6= I∗. To determine whether political outcomes
yield ”underprovision” or ”overprovision” of investment, we compare
I∗ with aggregate consumer surplus maximizing investment level
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and social surplus maximizing investment level
(3.5) Iw = argmax
I≥0
W(I) ≡ arg max
IinW0W
0.
In the two variants of the political process — referendum and pair-
wise voting — we analyze the cases ˆ y(0) = 1
2 and ˆ y(0) < 1
2 separately.
The discussion of the complete coverage case brings out the voting me-
chanics in simple fashion which we utilize in the subsequent sections
dealing with spatial competition in circular city model. Moreover, it
also highlights the importance of market competition, or actually a lack
thereof, in generating infrastructure traps. On the other hand, endog-
enizing market participation, the incomplete coverage case presents a
rich voting behavior and shows that ”infrastructure traps” can arise,
even with competition, if the initial coverage is too low.
3.1. Complete Coverage. First we consider the case where the initial
market coverage is complete, i.e. ˆ y(0) = 1
2. As we see below, market
structure plays an important role in the political outcome.
3.1.1. Monopoly(n = 1): Under monopoly, the market coverage is com-
plete with t = t0 if t0 < 2β(A−c
1+β). Substituting the monopoly price
p∗ = A −
t0−I
2β in V (y,I) in (2.2) and subsequently substituting result-
ing V (y,I) in (2.4) yields S(y,I) = (t0 − I)(1
2 − y)β −
γI2
2 . Then,











implying that every consumer is worse oﬀ from a positive level of in-
vestment. The reasoning is as follows. The monopolist raises the price
which exactly oﬀsets the beneﬁt from reduction in transport costs for
the farthest consumer. Other consumers face the same increase in
prices but enjoys less savings in transport costs. Thus all consumers
except the most distant ones are strictly worse oﬀ even in absence of
tax considerations. The consumer with address y = 1
2 is strictly worse
oﬀ because of the strictly positive tax level implied by I > 0.
The above analysis implies that no consumer votes in favour of any
I > 0. Thus, status quo t = t0 is preserved and accordingly R0 = {0}.
Since there does not exist any I > 0 which beats the status quo I = 0,
it follows that I = 0 is the unique Condorcet winner, i.e. I∗ = 0. Since
each consumer is worse oﬀ for I > 0 , the aggregate consumer surplus is
strictly lower as well. Hence, B0 = {0} and this in turn implies Ib = 0.POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT: A SPATIAL APPROACH 9






∗ − (t0 − I)y
β]dy + (p
∗ − c) −
γI2
2









is positive for all I ≤ 1
2β−1(1+β)γ. Hence W 0 := {I : 0 ≤ I ≤ 1
2β−1(1+β)γ}
and Iw = argmaxW 0 = 1
2β(1+β)γ. Proposition 1 summarizes the ﬁnding.
Proposition 1: For t0 < 2β(A−c
1+β) and n = 1,
(i) R0 = B0 = {0} ⊂ W 0.
(ii) I∗ = Ib = 0 < Iw.
Proposition 1 suggests that though there are welfare improving pos-
itive investment levels, in absence of shareholding, political processes
- referendum as well as voting - preserve status quo t = t0. The ”in-
frastructural trap” or zero investment in this case is generated due to
monopoly market structure and zero shareholdings.
3.1.2. Competition(n ≥ 2): For n ≥ 2,p∗ = c and hence ﬁrms earn
zero proﬁts. In absence of proﬁts the two surplus measures are equiv-
alent, i.e. B(I) = W(I). Moreover, as long as the market is covered,
aggregate social surplus W(I) under competition remains the same as
in monopoly since equilibrium price p∗ — which diﬀer for these two
scenarios — are essentially transfer from consumers to producers and

















dI = −γ < 0 the preferences(over I) are single
peaked. Then, applying the standard median voter theorem, it follows
that the investment level most preferred by the median voter is the
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Note that for all β ≥ 1, 4βγ ≥ 2β(1 + β)γ, implying I∗ ≤ Ib = Iw. The
equality holds only for β = 1.
Turning to referendum, a consumer y ∈ [0, 1
2] votes against status
quo if





Using the fact that S(y,I) − S(y,0) is strictly increasing in y we ﬁnd
that, an investment level I > 0 wins the majority support, and accord-
ingly passed in referendum if and only if the median consumer is better
oﬀ compared to the status quo. Noting that |y| = 1
4 median consumer,
the above statement can be restated as:





4,0) ≥ 0 ⇔ I ≤ 2
4βγ and for all β ≥ 1, 2
4βγ ≤
1
2β−1(1+β)γ, it follows that R0 ⊆ B0 = W 0. The Proposition below
summarizes the discussion from this subsection.
Proposition 2: For t0 < 2β(A − c) and n ≥ 2,
(i) R0 ⊆ B0 = W 0 and
(ii) I∗ ≤ Ib = Iw, where equality in (i) and (ii) holds for β = 1 only.
Though political process does not generate any infrastructure trap
under competition, in presence of strictly convex transportation costs
(β > 1), there exists surplus enhancing investment levels (which in-
creases aggregate consumer surplus well as the aggregate social sur-
plus) which are not politically feasible — gets beaten by status quo in
pairwise voting. Similarly, I∗ < Iw for all β > 1. The underlying rea-
son for the underprovision is that the distance travelled by the median
voter 1
4β is less than the average distance travelled 1
2β−1(1+β) and hence
the savings in transportation cost for a given investment level is valued
less to a median voter compared to the social planner.
3.2. Incomplete Coverage: Complete coverage only occurs if infras-
tructure investment is ”cheap”. However this is hardly the case in de-
veloping countries and low level of infrastructure provision creates bar-
riers for market participation. In such cases, additional infrastructure
investment not only creates diﬀerential beneﬁts for existing consumers
but also draws new consumer to the market. To focus on the conﬂict-
ing interests and infrastructure traps arising from incomplete coverage
alone, we abstract away from monopoly and strictly convex transporta-
tion cost - the factors responsible for ”infrastructure traps” and ”under-
provision” for the complete coverage case. In particular we assume thatPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT: A SPATIAL APPROACH 11
(i) n ≥ 2 implying p∗ = c and (ii) β = 1. Also, implicit in the incom-
plete coverage case, is the fact that ˆ y(0) = A−c
t0 < 1
2 ⇒ t0 > 2(A − c).
We further assume that




Assumption 1 implies that S(y,t0) = A−c−
γt2
0
2 < 0, i.e. I = t0 is too
costly.7
Corresponding to any investment level I > 0, the surplus for a con-
sumer y is given by:
S(y,I) = A − c − (t0 − I)y −
γI2
2





Consider y < ˆ y(0). Amongst these consumers, the savings from re-
duction in transport cost from t0 to t0 −I is zero for y = 0, and higher
the farther the consumer. Hence, accounting for taxes, a consumer does
not receive any positive beneﬁt unless she lives beyond a certain dis-
tance. Let yL(I) denote the least distant consumer who is not worse oﬀ
from investment I. That is, yL(I) satisﬁes S(yL(I),I) − S(yL(I),0) =
0 ⇔ IyL(I) −
γI2





Now consider y > ˆ y(0). Investment increases market participation
and for the new participants the surplus from consumption V (y,I) =
A − c − (t0 − I)y is positive. However, unless the surplus from con-
sumption V (y,I) exceeds the taxes
γI2
2 , the net surplus S(y,I) < 0.
Since V (y,I) is decreasing in y, the consumer living beyond a certain
distance become worse oﬀ due to additional investment. For an in-
vestment level I, let yU(I) denote the address of farthest consumer
who is no worse oﬀ. If S(1
2,I) ≥ 0, yU(I) = 1
2 else yU(I) satisﬁes
S(yU(I),I) = 0 ⇔ A − c − (t0 − I)yU(I) −
γI2
2 = 0. Hence
(3.11) yU(I) = min{








From the discussion above it follows that, corresponding to a given
level of investment, the measure of net beneﬁciaries are given by yU(I)−
yL(I). Given that a half of the unit mass of consumers are uniformly
distributed in [0, 1
2], a proposal of an investment level I is passed in
7This was implicit in other cases as well. We explicitly state this here, as the
proofs of some claims in this subsection use this assumption quite heavily.12 ARGHYA GHOSH AND KIERON MEAGHER
referendum if and only if yU(I) − yL(I) ≥ 1
4. Thus, for the incomplete
coverage case
(3.12) R




Consider the scenario where initially less than half of the consumers
are served, i.e. ˆ y(0) = A−c
t0 < 1
4. We show in appendix that it suﬃces
to consider I ≤
2(A−c)
γt0 since for I >
2(A−c)
γt0 , S(y,I) − S(y,0) < 0 for all
I. 8 For all such investment levels,
(3.13) yU(I) − yL(I) ≥
1
4
⇔ (4(A − c) − t0) + (1 − 2γt0)I ≥ 0.
Note that as 4(A − c) − t0 < 0 and 1 − 2γt0 < 0, there does not exist
any I > 0 satisfying (), leading to infrastructure trap. Hence R0 = {0}
and accordingly I∗ = 0. The condition 1 − 2γt0 < 0 implies that
cost of infrastructure provision is large (γ > 1
2t0) which renders some
investment levels politically infeasible. However given the quadratic
investment cost speciﬁcation
γI2
2 — which implies that the marginal
cost of investment of the ﬁrst unit is zero — one might expect that
small investment levels should be feasible. In determining political
feasibility of small investment levels one needs to consider whether




yU(I) − yL(I) =
A − c
t0




implying small investment levels cannot garner majority support.
Given 4(A − c) − t0 < 0, it follows that positive investment levels
are able to win majority only if 1 − 2γt0 > 0, i.e. γ < 1
2t0. For such
parameter values, it follows from (3.11) that the set of politically fea-
sible investments are given by I >
t0−4(A−c)
1−2γt0 . However, it turns out
that, there does not exist any investment level I > 0, which satisﬁes
(i) I ≤
2(A−c)
γt0 as well as (ii) I >
t0−4(A−c)
1−2γt0 . Though there is no strictly
positive investment level that beats status quo and hence set of politi-
cally feasible outcomes R0 = {0}, the set B0 = {I : B(I) − B(0) ≥ 0}














8Furthermore, for all such investment levels, S(1
2,I) < 0 ⇒ S(1
2,I)−S(1
2,0) < 0
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Then, B0 ⊃ {0} follows from noting that (i) B(I)−B(0) is continuous
in I for all I ≥ 0, and (ii) d
dI[B(I) − B(0)]|I=0 = (A−c
t0 )2 > 0. Clearly
I∗ = argmaxI∈B0B0 > 0. Since p∗ = c and Π = 0, B0 = W 0 and
accordingly Iw = argmaxI∈W0W 0 = argmaxI∈B0B0 = Ib. Proposition
3 summarizes the ﬁnding.
Proposition 3: If t0 > max{
q
2(A−c)
γ ,4(A − c)},
(i) R0 = {0} ⊂ B0 = W0, and
(ii) I∗ = 0 < Ib = Iw.
The future versions of the paper will incorporate detailed description
of the case t0 < 4(A − c), i.e. ˆ y(0) > 1
4. Here we just point out
that, since more than half of the consumers are served at t = t0, the
infrastructure trap cannot arise in such a scenario since limI→0 yU(I)−
yL(I) = A−c
t0 − 0 = ˆ y(0) > 1
4.
4. Spatial Competition
The central marketplace framework captures the diﬀerential beneﬁts
for consumers arising from the diﬀerence in their distances from the
center. However it assumes all ﬁrms are located at same place, and
as a consequence, price is driven down to marginal cost. This in turn
implies that price is independent of the level of infrastructure in the
economy. In this section, we adopt the circular city model a la Salop
(1979), where ﬁrms locate at diﬀerent points on the circle. In the short
run version of the model the number and locations of ﬁrms are assumed
to be ﬁxed and the spatial competition between ﬁrms arising from
locational diﬀerences links equilibrium prices to level of infrastructure
provision. While voting, consumer not only has to consider the eﬀect
of infrastructure investment on transport costs but also its’ eﬀect on
prices.
As in the previous section, we assume that government provides a
level of infrastructure investment I at cost
γI2
2 where the choice of I is
determined by the political process. Before analyzing infrastructure as
the outcome of a political game we ﬁrst need to determine the payoﬀs
for the players involved arising from the circular city set up.
Assume that a unit mass of consumers are uniformly distributed
around a circle C of circumference 1 with density 1. The locations
of consumers y are described in a clockwise manner starting from 12
o’clock. Assume there are n ﬁrms, with the location of ﬁrm i denoted
by xi. As described in section 2, each consumer buys one unit of the
product that gives her the highest indirect utility if this is nonnegative;
otherwise the consumer chooses not to purchase. That is consumers14 ARGHYA GHOSH AND KIERON MEAGHER
have a generic outside option, the utility of which we normalize to zero.
The indirect utility of a consumer located at y ∈ C from purchasing
variant i is:
(4.1) Vi(y) = A − pi − τ|y − xi|
β.
Firms have a constant marginal cost of c ≥ 0. We will make the
standard assumption that ﬁrms are evenly dispersed around the circle.9
Price Equilibria: We assume that the gross utility from consuming a
variety, A, is high enough (or equivalently t0 is low enough) such that
each consumers buys and the ﬁrms directly compete with its neighbor-
ing ﬁrms.10 If ﬁrms are equally spaced around the circle, that is at
distance 1/n from their nearest neighbor, then the unique symmetric
price equilibrium is given by(see Anderson et al. (1992, page 177))
(4.2) p






Note that p∗(I) is decreasing in I reﬂecting the fact that an increase in
investment level, i.e. a reduction in t, creates more competition among
the existing ﬁrms which in turn leads to lower equilibrium prices.
Surplus Measures: Recall the individual and aggregate surplus mea-
sures, S(y,I),B(I) and W(I), introduced in section 2. Reinstating the
power transportation cost function in the circular city setup and incor-
porating p = p∗(I) from (), we ﬁnd that for a consumer y ∈ C,
(4.3) S(y,I) = A − p








i is location of the ﬁrm nearest to consumer y. the equilibrium
Since n ﬁrms are equally spaced around the circle and equilibrium
price faced by each consumer is same it suﬃces to consider 1
n mass of
consumers served by a representative ﬁrm. Also, since those consumers
are symmetrically distributed around ﬁrm’s location we focus on 1
2n
mass of consumers located on one side of a particular ﬁrm. Given that
consumers are uniformly distributed and the market consist of 2n such
9Economides (1989) shows that this is the unique symmetric equilibrium in a
location-then-price game.
10If A is low, then each ﬁrm becomes a local monopolist. This case is analogous to
the incomplete coverage case described in subsection 3.2 with a mass 1
n of consumers
evenly distributed in [− 1
2n, 1
2n] and p∗ = A+c
2 — the monopoly price.POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT: A SPATIAL APPROACH 15




























4.1. Political Economy. We begin by comparing B0 := {I : I ≥
0,B(I)−B(0) ≥ 0} and W 0 := {I : I ≥ 0,W(I)−W(0) ≥ 0} — the set
of I that improves aggregate consumer surplus and welfare respectively






































Similarly using (4.4) we ﬁnd that
W









Comparing W 0 and B0 it follows that W 0 ⊂ B0. The reasoning is
simple. An increase in investment level increases B(I) through two
channels - reduction in equilibrium prices and reduction in aggregate
transport costs. However change in prices do not aﬀect W(I). This
implies that, corresponding to any change in I, the increase in W(I)
is less than the increase in B(I) and accordingly any investment level
that increases aggregate social surplus increases aggregate consumer
surplus as well. In other words, W 0 ⊂ B0. The argument above given
above applies for marginal changes in I too. Since marginal increase in
W(I) is less than that of B(I), and W(I) and B(I) are strictly concave,
it follows that Iw < Ib.
Now we turn to voting pattern of the consumers. Consider ﬁrm i and




y ∈ [0, 1
2n] votes against status quo if
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Observe that S(y,I) − S(y,0) is continuous in I and y and strictly
increasing in y. This implies that if a consumer ˜ y votes for the proposed
investment level all consumers y ≥ ˜ y votes for it as well. Utilizing
this property we ﬁnd that ﬁnd an investment level I wins majority
support over status quo if and only if the median consumer is better
oﬀ compared to the status quo. Noting that |y| = 1
4n is the median
consumer, the set of investment level that beats status quo in pairwise
voting is given by:
R


















Also, since preferences are single peaked — follows from strict con-
cavity of S(y,I) — the most preferred investment level of the median





















Comparing the voting outcomes with the surplus benchmarks yields
Proposition 4: In a circular city model, with n ≥ 2,
(i) W 0 ⊂ R0 ⊆ B0, and
(ii) Iw < I∗ ≤ Ib, where equality holds only for β = 1.
The savings in transport costs for the median consumer, due to im-
proved infrastructure, is less than the average savings. This implies
that there are investment levels I which increases B(I) but not favoured
by the median consumer, and accordingly not supported by the ma-
jority. Hence R0 ⊆ B0. Since the savings are valued similarly in W 0
and B0, the argument described above would suggest that R0 ⊆ W 0
as well. However, recall that the change in aggregate social surplus,
W(I) − W(0), does not take into account the beneﬁcial eﬀect of price
reduction due to improved infrastructure. This enlarges the set R0,
and in fact for the speciﬁcation chosen, it turns out that W 0 ⊂ R0.
Similar arguments can be used to establish Proposition 4(ii).
In contrast to our ﬁndings in the central marketplace framework with
complete coverage, we ﬁnd that there is ”overprovision” of infrastruc-
ture. However, the ﬁnding is contingent on the competitive behavior
of ﬁrms. In presence of collusion — analogous to complete coverage
and monopoly in the previous section — p∗(I)(= A − (t0 − I)( 1
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increasing in I. The loss from increased prices outweighs gains from
transport cost savings which in turn leads to the following:
Proposition 5: In presence of collusion in the circular city framework,
(i) R0 = B0 = {0} ⊂ W 0.
(ii) I∗ = Ib = 0 < Iw.
The ﬁndings in Proposition 4 and 5 highlights the importance of
market reforms in representative democracies willing to undertake in-
frastructural changes. Even though welfare improving changes exist, in
absence of competition, those changes might not be politically viable.
For many years, global institutions such as World bank have pushed
for market reforms before providing any aid in terms of infrastrcutu-
ral improvements. Also, there is a folk wisdom that market structure
and infrastructure provisions are related. Our framework provides a
explicit link between the two and suggest that indeed workings of the
market has important bearings on infrastructure provision.
4.2. Spatial Competition with Free Entry. In our analysis so far,
the number and locations of ﬁrms are assumed to be given. The as-
sumption is appropriate for short run analysis, but, in the long run,
the ﬁrms can change locations and furthermore entry and exit occurs
in the industry. To incorporate these features into our framework and
examine the consequent eﬀects on the voting outcome we consider a
slightly modiﬁed set up.
On the production side, in addition to marginal cost c ≥ 0, now
assume that the each ﬁrm has to incur ﬁxed cost K > 0 whenever it
produces a positive amount. Consider a sequential game, where corre-
sponding to a given level of infrastructure provision t = t0 −I, a ﬁrm i
ﬁrst decides whether to enter and subsequently post-entry it chooses lo-
cation (xi) and then price (pi). If n ﬁrms have entered in the ﬁrst stage,
the location and price of ﬁrm i in the unique symmetric equilibrium,
denoted by ¯ xi and ¯ pi respectively, are as follows(see Economides(1989):










Treating n as a continuous variable, the free-entry number of ﬁrms
corresponding to a given level of investment I, denoted by n∗(I) is
obtained from solving the zero proﬁts condition (¯ p − c) 1
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For a given I ≥ 0, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome
of the three-stage game — entry(stage 1), location choice(stage 2)




i=1 ,p∗(I)) where n∗(I) is as in (), and x∗
i(I) and p∗(I)
are ¯ xi and ¯ pi respectively evaluated at n = n∗(I).
Suppose the initial level of infrastructure provision in the economy




i=1 and p∗(0) respectively. While voting for a I > 0,
a consumer y correctly anticipates n∗(I) and p∗(I). However, since
any equispaced location of n∗(I) ﬁrms constitutes an equilibrium, a
consumer needs to compute the expected utility over all possible values
of distances |y − x∗
i(I)| where x∗
i(I) denote the location of the nearest
ﬁrm. Clearly |y − x∗
i(I)| ∈ [0, 1
2n∗(I)], and using this, the expected
surplus from a investment I > 0 is:
S(y,I) = A − p


















Since S(y,I) = ¯ S(I) for all y ∈ C,B(I) =
R
y∈C ¯ S(I)dy = ¯ S(I) and
moreover since proﬁts are zero in free-entry equilibrium, the two ag-
gregate surplus measures are equivalent, i.e. W(I) = B(I). Combining
these two observations yields that, for all I > 0,








Note that a consumer is uncertain of the distance travelled (and ac-
cordingly the magnitude of change in transport costs) only if a strictly
positive level of investment is voted for. If no investment is undertaken
and the status quo is preserved the ﬁrms are assumed to maintain the
initial locations. This yields
(4.11) S(y,0) = A − p


















Since n∗(I) and p∗(I) are continuous in I for all I ≥ 0, limI→0 B(I) −
B(0) = 0. Furthermore,
dB(I)
dI |I=0 > 0. This implies that there existsPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT: A SPATIAL APPROACH 19
strictly positive investment levels which increases aggregate consumer




0 ⊃ {0}, (4.13)





¯ S(I) > 0 (4.14)
Now we turn to voting. Since S(y,I) = ¯ S(I) for all y, and S(y,0)
is decreasing in y it follows that S(y,I) − S(y,0) is increasing in y.
Exploiting this, it can be shown that, I > 0 beats status quo if and
only if the median consumer votes for status quo. The relevant median
is the one with respect to initial equilibrium conﬁguration. Noting that
the median is located at the 1
4n∗(0) distance from the nearest ﬁrm, the
claim can be stated as follows.





0 ⇔ ¯ S(I) − S(x∗
i + 1
4n∗(0),0).
Though B(I) = ¯ S(I) for I > 0, the transportation costs incurred by
the median consumer is less than the average transportation costs in
the status quo and hence B(0) ≤ S(x∗
i + 1
4n∗(0),0). This implies that
B(I) − B(0) ≥ ¯ S(I) − S(x∗
i + 1
4n∗(0),0) which in turn implies that
B0 ⊇ R0, where equality only holds for β = 1. Furthermore we ﬁnd
that
Lemma 4: For β > 1, I(> 0) ∈ R0 only if I > ¯ I(β).
The lemma suggests that, unless the proposed investment level is
higher than a certain threshold, it cannot win referendum. Since an
inﬁnitesimally small investment requires zero cost this might seem sur-
prising. However, whether inﬁnitesimally small investment levels are
politically viable (i.e. can win referendum) depends on the preferences
of the median consumer. Evaluating the median consumer’s change in
net surplus from arbitrarily small levels of investment yields,
lim
I→0
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where the inequality follows from the fact that 4β ≥ 2β(1 + β) (the
inequality is strict for β > 1). The median consumer dislikes inﬁnites-
imally small levels of investment since that only increases the trans-
portation costs by discrete amount — she now has to bear the average
transportation cost which is higher than the median transportation
cost — while the other beneﬁts, e.g. from lower p∗ and lower t, are
negligible.
Note that since B(I) = ¯ S(I), the most preferred investment level for
any consumer y, amongst the strictly positive ones is argmaxI>0 ¯ S(I) =
argmaxI>0 B(I) = Ib. If ¯ S(Ib) − S(x∗
i + 1
4n∗(0),0)) > 0 then Ib = I∗.
Else I∗ = 0 which occurs if γ is larger than a critical value, ¯ γ say.
Obviously, when I∗ = 0, R0 = 0.
Proposition 6: In a circular city model with free entry and β > 1,
R0 ⊂ B0 = W 0 and I∗ = Ib = Iw > 0 provided γ ≤ ¯ γ. For γ > ¯ γ, R0 =
0 and I∗ = 0. For β = 1,R0 = B0 = W 0 as well as I∗ = Ib = Iw > 0.
In the previous sections we have shown that the infrastructure trap
can arise due to monopoly, zero share-holdings and incomplete cover-
age. None of these features contribute to the possibility of trap shown
here. The uncertainty regarding the distance ex post —in particular
the possibility that distance can be larger — renders small changes
politically non-viable and if γ is suitably large, the moderate or high
level of investment levels cannot do not remain feasible either leading
to the ”trap”.
5. Conclusion
Despite the importance of public infrastructure investments, little
attention has been paid to the determinants of investment levels. We
provide a political economy foundation for the decision on investment
for a variety of market structures based upon the variants of spatial
competition. In all these models we interpret a reduction in transport
cost as investment in infrastructure.
The government’s choice of infrastructure investment is ﬁnanced by a
lump sum tax on individuals. Governmental choice of investment level
is considered under two related political paradigms - (i) a referendum
in a representative democracy where individuals vote yes or no for a
proposed increase to the status quo level of infrastructure and (ii) a
pairwise voting process in a representative democracy which produces
a Condorcet winner when individuals vote sincerely for their preferred
level of infrastructure.POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT: A SPATIAL APPROACH 21
The political process tends not to produce socially optimal infras-
tructure investment. However the source and magnitude of the ineﬃ-
ciency depend in subtle ways on the characteristics of the market envi-
ronment. We analyse a number of aspects of the market environment:
market structure (competition versus collusion/monopoly); supply dis-
persion (single marketplace versus multiple ﬁrm locations); initial level
of development (incomplete versus complete coverage); transport cost
curvature (linear versus strictly convex); and entry (short run versus
long-running equilibrium).
Rather than provide a complete taxonomy of dozens of conﬁgura-
tions we instead consider a number of key cases, based on signiﬁcant
real-world situations. Analysing the ineﬃciency in these key cases illus-
trates that the eﬀect of each of the market environment aspects is not
constant but depends on subtle interactions with other aspects of the
market environment. For example, competition with convex transport
costs in a single marketplace produces under provision but competition
on the circle produces overprovision.
An interesting and frequent ﬁnding is that of infrastructure traps:
choice of zero infrastructure investment in a referendum or election
where and positive investment is socially optimal. We identify a num-
ber of quite distinct causes: monopoly and complete coverage either
in a single marketplace or on the circle; competition in a single mar-
ketplace with incomplete coverage; and free entry on the circle (under
certain cost conditions).
By endogenizing the transport cost parameter as a politically deter-
mined infrastructure investment we allow consumers, in their dual role
as voters, to partially determine the environment they face when they
make purchasing decisions. From the cases considered here this ap-
proach, of allowing consumers some role in choosing the “ rules of the
game”, appears to produce a rich new model without a great deal of ad-
ditional technical complexity. Our results highlight the importance of
combining political economy and industrial organisation analysis when
considering infrastructure investment.
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